Os limites da linguagem e o trabalho da filosofia no tractatus Wiittgenstein

Abstract

Enthusiastically received by the Vienna’s Circle, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus of Ludwig Wittgenstein inspired the whole generation of philosophers and scientists who would adopt it as a referenced title for the Linguistic Turn. The value of that reception, registered overcoat in the manifest The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle, stimulated one interpretation of the Tractatus as a theoretical basement for the construction of a strong criticism to metaphysics purposes, also to consolidate the fundaments of verifiability. Although it has became successful in establishing a diversified scenario of investigation about logic and signification, having the logical analysis of the propositional meaning purposed by Tractatus as one of its more important bases, this tradition of reading sometimes has been the target to harsh criticism from the Wittgenstein part. Reacting against the verificacionist interpretation of the fundamentals of his philosophy and unsatisfied with the idea that he would be considered one philosopher who agreed with the interests that motivated the logical positivism, Wittgenstein adopted one posture of reclusion and lack of willingness to talk with the members of the Vienna Circle. For Wittgenstein, the logical positivism would stop giving value to what it itself would judge as a fundamental purpose of philosophy, something that would not only sense the Tractatus as it would be, after all, the meaning of life. In this perspective, the considerations about ethics and the mystical of Tractatus, contrary to contribute nothing to the correct comprehension of the tractatiana philosophy – as some adherents of the logical positivism would believe – they would, in truth, take on the bases that would support the most important dimension of the Wittgenstein’s philosophy; dimension that not only would recover the Tractatus as also its counterpart unwritten and fundamentally the most important – as would have say it in a letter to von Ficker. With effect, our dissertation intends to analyze the tension between the verificacionist interpretation of Tractatus and the real philosophical pretensions of Wittgenstein, by one side, as a tentative to establish theoretical approaches and gaps between these two positions; and on the other to catch possible reasons for Wittgenstein non-satisfaction in front of the directions of verificacionism. Thereby, we believe that in the end of our essay, we’d indicate some of these reasons by the time, therefore, we’ll also set a proper perspective of Wittgenstein on his philosophy.