A gramática da certeza em Wittgenstein: critério de medida e resultado de medições

Abstract

Wittgenstein’s reflection On Certainty analyses the role played by propositions situated on the border between logic and experience in our system of empirical judgments. Thus, as he considers the minimal elements of meaning as linguistic, Wittgenstein forges a singular conception of certainty. Certainty, which crosses our symbolic manipulations, would not, by nature, be placed in propositions, for such certainty would result from our way of acting and judging, once our judgment practices sediment the characteristic necessity of grammatical propositions. Since propositions encompass that notion of necessity, they may condition experience only in a certain sense, for they do not entirely abandon the empirical traffic. Our paper, in large measure, concentrates on that idea as it consists of an analysis of Wittgenstein’s investigation in On Certainty. Analyzing Wittgenstein’s reflection, having that idea in view, we decided to present elements from which the book On Certainty can be read as privileged place of reflection about the conditions that make possible the elaboration of meaningful propositions. We point out the presentation of those elements in opposition to the idea that it is only a set of observations intended for criticizing Moore. Thus, the question about the role played by grammatical propositions in our system of empirical judgments is a sign that Wittgenstein’s observations in On Certainty organize themselves as a reflection on the limits of sense. And it is just such a question that grants autonomy to Wittgenstein’s reflection in relation to Moore’s philosophy.