Os limites do sentido da intuição em Kant e Husserl

Abstract

This thesis' aim is to analyze whether the sense of intuition can be expanded when comparing Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, as expressed in his Logical Investigations (1900-1901), with Kant's transcendental metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason (1787). The general hypothesis of this study suggests that both Kant and Husserl favor the defense of the sense of intuition reduced to the categorial sphere, making it necessary to enlarge the analysis of the sense to defend it as an independent and original structure of knowledge. In Kantian transcendental metaphysics, the a priori structure of understanding subsumes the sense expressed in empirical intuition, considering it to possess an intrinsic epistemic blindness. Although this intuition is responsible for granting sense to the concepts of understanding, the transcendent signification produced by the categories hides the original sense. Conversely, by removing the exclusivity of being from the copula of the judgment and demonstrating that the intensity of the fulfillment of categorial acts depends on the contents of sensible intuition, Husserl attributes categorial aspects to intuition, thus expanding the notion of sense. Following this Husserlian conceptualization, in History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (1925), Heidegger argues that the relational state of true-being and identical-being are a priori laws that subsist in themselves. This definition gains greater emphasis when we realize that it was already present, albeit in an incipient form, in Reinach's Concerning Phenomenology (1914), where he argues for the subsistence of the a priori. Thus, it becomes possible to defend greater autonomy of the sense of intuition concerning the categorial sphere, when grounded in the realist a priori theory of the laws of essence, perfected by the early Göttingen phenomenologists.